News
02 JUL - BEA releases interim report on Air France Airbus A330 accident 02 JUL - ANSV: premature visual descent below minima at night caused Citation CFIT accide
06 JUL - CAA UK publishes Aircraft maintenance incident analysis 1996-2006
09 JUL - ICAO: global blacklist would not necessarily reduce accidents
14 JUL - Garuda, Airfast, Mandala, Premiair taken off EU black list
17 JUL - NTSB issues recommendations on Learjet 60 inadvertent thrust reverser stowage
20 JUL - EASA issues emergency AD on ATR-42/72 cockpit windows
23 JUL - UK Airprox Board publishes 2008 statistics
26 JUL - Iran suspends license of Aria Air
31 JUL - EASA plans to mandate replacement of air speed indicator probes
02 JUL 2009 BEA releases interim report on Air France Airbus A330 accident [to table of contents]
The French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA) released an interim report based on the initial evidence gathered in the
course of the investigation of the June 2 accident involving an Air France A330.
Some of the findings are:
* the meteorological situation was typical of that encountered in the month of June in the inter-tropical convergence zone;
* there were powerful cumulonimbus clusters on the route of AF447. Some of them could have been the centre of some notable turbulence;
* several airplanes that were flying before and after AF 447, at about the same altitude, altered their routes in order to avoid cloud masses;
* twenty-four automatic maintenance messages were received between 02:10 and 02:15 via the ACARS system. These messages show inconsistency between the measured speeds as well as the associated consequences;
* visual examination showed that the airplane was not destroyed in flight; it appears to have struck the surface of the sea in a straight line with high vertical acceleration.
(BEA)
f-cp090601ae
The Italian ANSV accident board released the final report of their investigation into the CFIT accident involving a Cessna Citation I near Cagliari in February 2004. It was concluded that the airplane descended significantly below the area minimum altitude (AMA), insufficient to maintain the separation from the ground during a night visual approach in the absence of adequate visual reference. Possible contributory factors included: - The aircraft was not equipped with GPWS or TAWS, nor was it required to be by law; - Premature VFR descent after misidentifying lights on the ground as the Elmas runway lights (induced by "black hole approach") - Failure to use published procedures and available instruments under conditions of total darkness; - Read errors of the elevations listed in the maps consulted, facilitated by the non representation of the ground color; - Inadequate rest, which may have contributed to a reduction in the performance of the crew. (ANSV)
ANSV report
06 JUL 2009 CAA UK publishes Aircraft maintenance incident analysis 1996-2006 [to table of contents] The objective of the CAA U.K. study was to analyse a selection of maintenance related events on jet aircraft above 5,700kg MTOW, captured and stored under the requirements of the CAA's Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) scheme to identify trends, themes and common causes or factors. A total of 3,982 maintenance related MORs for the period January 1996 to December 2006 was studied. In the results, just over half of the occurrences analysed were attributed to incorrect maintenance actions, a quarter to ineffective maintenance control and a fifth to incomplete maintenance. The data showed that the vast majority of MORs were related to ATA Chapter 25 (Equipment and Furnishings), escape slides in particular. (CAA)
CAA Paper 2009/05
09 JUL 2009 ICAO: global blacklist would not necessarily reduce accidents [to table of contents] During a joint European Community - ICAO press conference Antonio Tajani, EC Vice-President in charge of Transport proposed to work on creating a global blacklist for unsafe airlines. ICAO Council president Roberto Kobeh Gonzalez rejected this EU proposal, saying "I don't think that it is the solution at global level. There are various actions to be taken to avoid accidents. Lists that discourage passenger to use a concrete airline would not necessarily reduce accidents." (EC)
EC soundbite transcript
14 JUL 2009 Garuda, Airfast, Mandala, Premiair taken off EU black list [to table of contents] The European Commission adopted the eleventh update of the Community’s list of airlines banned in the European Union. Significant improvements and accomplishments of the Indonesian civil aviation authority are recognised in the area of safety. Since the imposition of the ban in July 2007, four air carriers – Garuda Indonesia, Airfast Indonesia, Mandala Airlines and Premiair were taken off the list, because their authority ensures that they respect the international safety standards. The Thai carrier One Two Go has been removed from the list as its certificate has been revoked by the Thai aviation authorities. Progress made by the civil aviation authority of Angola and the air carrier TAAG Angola Airlines to resolve progressively any safety deficiencies are recognised. In that context, the cooperation and assistance agreement signed between the civil aviation authorities of Angola and of Portugal allowed the airline to operate again into Portugal only with certain aircraft and under very strict conditions. Safety deficiencies identified in the system of oversight by the aviation authorities of Zambia and Kazakhstan, led to an operating ban on all carriers from these two countries, with the exception of the Kazakh air carrier Air Astana, whose operations into the Community are frozen under strict restrictions. (EU)
press release
17 JUL 2009 NTSB issues recommendations on Learjet 60 inadvertent thrust reverser stowage [to table of contents] The National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) investigation of the September 2008 runway overrun accident involving a Learjet 60 is ongoing. However, on the basis of preliminary findings, the NTSB is concerned about safety issues involving inadvertent stowage of the thrust reversers. The NTSB recommends that the FAA: - Require Learjet to change the design of the Learjet 60 thrust lever system in future-manufactured airplanes so that the reverse lever positions in the cockpit match the positions of the thrust reverser mechanisms at the engines when the thrust reversers stow. (A-09-55) - Once design changes are developed per Safety Recommendation A-09-55, require Learjet 60 operators to retrofit existing airplanes so that the reverse lever positions in the cockpit match the positions of the thrust reverser mechanisms at the engines when the thrust reversers stow. (A-09-56) - Require Learjet to develop and install improved aural or visual cues on future-manufactured Learjet 60 airplanes that would allow pilots to recognize an inadvertent thrust reverser stowage in a timely manner. (A-09-57) - Once improved aural or visual cues are developed per Safety Recommendation A-09-57, require Learjet 60 operators to install those cues on existing Learjet 60 airplanes. (A-09-58) - Require that all Learjet 60 pilots receive training, for takeoff as well as landing phases of flight, on recognizing an inadvertent thrust reverser stowage, including the possibility that the stowage can occur when the requirements for deploying thrust reversers are not fully met, such as when the air/ground sensor squat switch circuits are damaged. (A-09-59) - Evaluate the design of the thrust reverser controls and indications in Raytheon Hawker 1000 business jets for potential thrust reverser failure modes that are similar to those identified in Learjet 60 airplanes and implement necessary changes. (A-09-60) (NTSB)
Safety Recommendations A-09-55/60
20 JUL 2009 EASA issues emergency AD on ATR-42/72 cockpit windows [to table of contents] EASA requires operators of certain ATR-42/72 airplanes to inspect the cockpit forward side windows for damage/absence of repair. A recent event occurred during which the LH forward side glass window of an ATR 72-212 aeroplane blew out while performing a ground pressure test. The investigation revealed some anomalies on the forward side window at the level of the z-bar on the windows external side and at the level of the inner retainer on the windows internal side. These anomalies are considered as precursors of this failure. Air or water leakages between the z-bar and the outer glass ply, or between the inner retainer and inner glass ply indicates the presence of deteriorating structural components in the window. It must also be noticed that neither ATR nor PPG Aerospace authorizes repairs on the window Z-bar / Z-bar sealant. Any attempted repairs on these forward side window Z-bars/Z-bar sealants could lead to a similar event that has originated this AD. (EASA)
Emergency AD 2009-0159-E
23 JUL 2009 UK Airprox Board publishes 2008 statistics [to table of contents] The UK Airprox Board (UKAB) published their 21st report covering statistics for all of 2008 together with findings on recorded Airprox incidents within UK airspace between July and December 2008. During the last six months of 2008, 68 Airprox were reported and investigated, 22 fewer than the average of comparable figures recorded in each of the previous five years. During 2008 there was a total of 155 Airprox compared with 154 in 2007. Of these, 61 involved at least one Commercial Air Transport (CAT) aircraft compared with 65 in 2007. Two of the 61 incidents were judged as risk-bearing, the lowest number recorded in the period 1999 to 2008. There were no Category A (actual risk of collision) events involving CAT aircraft recorded in 2008. (UK Airprox Board)
Analysis of Airprox in UK Airspace - Jul - Dec 2008 Report No 21
26 JUL 2009 Iran suspends license of Aria Air [to table of contents] The Iranian Civil Aviation Organization (CAO) suspended the Air Operator Certificate (AOC) of Aria Air following a fatal accident on July 24. The license is suspended until the accident investigation is completed. (IRIB) 31 JUL 2009 EASA plans to mandate replacement of air speed indicator probes [to table of contents]
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) plans to propose an Airworthiness Directive mandating that all Airbus A330/A340 aircraft currently fitted with Thales pitot probes must be fitted with at least two Goodrich probes, allowing a maximum of one Thales BA type probe to remain fitted on the aircraft (each aircraft is equipped with 3 pitot tubes). The older Thales probes of the type AA would no longer be fitted. All three types comply with the applicable safety standards and the Agency's proposals are therefore intended as a precautionary measure. The publication of the Agency’s proposals with further details, which are still being elaborated, is foreseen within the next 14 days. The Agency’s proposals, which have been agreed with Airbus, are based on pitot probe performance data which the Agency has analysed in recent weeks. (EASA)
